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Two pilgrims travelling o’er the sands one day,
Saw a great oyster that was washed their way:
Their fingers pointed-wildly stared their eyes;
Their mouths both watered for the tempting prize:
One springing, stooped in haste to seize the prey,
The other bawled while driving him away:
‘Not quite so fast-let us decide our right;
’Tis his to whom it first appeared in sight,
And while he sucks, the other may look on.’
‘If that’s the argument you go upon,
My sight is good, thank God,’ his neighbour cried.
‘And mine’s not bad,’ his friend as quick replied;
‘I saw it first, or may I die!’
‘Be it,’ his neighbour made reply;
‘You’ll own. I first the oyster fait.’
While thus in vain dispute they dwelt,
John Doe came past-as judge they bid him sit.
* J.D. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. The author would like to thank Prof. Moréteau for his guidance in the
editing and publication of this case note.




       
      
      
        
       
 
        
        
        
       
 
             
 
  
           
        
        
             
        
       
         
   
  
       
        
           
      
      
           
      
          
       
                                                                                                         
             
      
334 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
The clients’ eyes with pleasing hope were lit.
Grave John the oyster oped and swallowed it.
He wiped his mouth, and said in judge-like speech:
‘Whereas the court allows a shell to each,
Free of all costs-go home, and live like friends.’
Count what it costs before a lawsuit ends;
Count what it takes from starving families’ backs:
John gets the cash and home the client sends,
And barely for their papers leaves them sacks.
Jean de La Fontaine, The Oyster and the Litigants, Fables, IX, 9 (1671)
I. INTRODUCTION
May a party to a contract when subrogated to the other party’s
rights to compensation for actual damages benefit from a windfall
when compensation payable under a settlement is well in excess of
the actual loss? Vekic v. Popich, a case decided in the wake of the
2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, illustrates
the idea that subrogation should be interpreted in light of the agree-
ment as a whole while also considering equity in situations not pre-
viously contemplated by the parties.
II. BACKGROUND 
In 2009, plaintiff, Nikola Vekic, attempted to purchase three
oyster leases owned by Dragutin Popich and his family.1 While Mr.
Popich was unwilling to execute a credit sale, he agreed to enter a
sublease with an option to purchase.2 With the help of an attorney,
the Popich family prepared a sublease with the option to purchase,
and a proposed act of sale. These documents were then sent to Mr.
Vekic along with a letter indicating that Mr. Popich was “unwilling 
to do a credit sale.” Mr. Vekic consented to a sublease for four years
unless it was terminated earlier by either party according to the
1. Vekic v. Popich, 215 So. 3d 483-484 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
2. Id. at 484.




          
     
           
            
           
           
        
       
          
       
      
          
           
     
      
       
          
         
        
         
             
        
        
               
        
      
         
       
          
      
                                                                                                         
     
      
              
            
3352019] VEKIC V. POPICH
lease’s provisions. The amount of rent was not to exceed $90,000,
with $30,000 due upon execution of the agreement3 and $20,000 due
annually over the next three years.4 Under the terms of the sublease,
Mr. Vekic had the option to purchase the leases at any time on or
before April 30, 2012. On April 20, 2010 the Deepwater Horizon
well exploded in the Gulf of Mexico.5 At the time of the explosion,
Mr. Vekic had not exercised his option to purchase and as such the
Popich family remained the leaseholder of record. However, the fol-
lowing year on or about June 19, 2011, Mr. Vekic exercised his op-
tion. The act of sale originally prepared in 2009 was executed with
no alterations to the original terms proposed.
Shortly after the explosion, a plaintiff class sued BP for dam-
ages and losses as a result of the explosion. By 2012, BP and the
plaintiff’s Steering Company had reached a settlement agreement
establishing a compensation plan for qualified oyster leaseholders
in exchange for settling their claims with BP and other released par-
ties. In order to receive a settlement payout, claimants were required
to (1) file a claim form with the Deepwater Horizon Economic
Claim Center (DHECC), (2) produce documents verifying that they
were the record owners of the leases with the Department of Wild-
life Fisheries on the day of the explosion, (3) show that their oyster
leases had state ID numbers, and (4) provide documents showing the
geographic area in which the oyster leases were located.
In June of 2012, Mr. Vekic filed a claim for all of his lease hold-
ings including the three oyster leases purchased from the Popich
family. In January 2013, Helen Popich, an attorney and daughter of
Mr. Popich filed claims for herself, her father, and her sister. The
submitted forms expressly informed the DHECC of the 2009 sub-
lease to Mr. Vekic and the post-explosion sale of the leases. The
forms also indicated that there had been no transfer or assignment
3. Id.
4. Id. at 485.
5. The Deepwater Horizon Well is an offshore drilling rig that was leased
to British Petroleum (BP) at the time of the explosion on April 20, 2010.




           
   
      
           
        
           
      
       
        
          
           
            
          
           
          
           
          
            
       
      
    
       
         
         
           
         
       
        
        
                                                                                                         
       
      
           
336 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
of rights to Mr. Vekic regarding the cause of action for the Deep-
water Horizon incident.
Subsequently, Mr. Vekic received a proposed settlement offer
for his lease holdings but not for the leases he had purchased from
Mr. Popich. The Popich family in turn received and accepted a set-
tlement offer for $901,999 in exchange for a release of any claims
arising out of or in any way related to the Deepwater Horizon inci-
dent.6 Mr. Vekic sued the Popich family alleging that he was entitled 
to the settlement proceedings pursuant to their agreement.
The Popich family later received notice of eligibility for a second 
round of payments. However, before the funds could be recovered, the
trial court had the money deposited into a trust account until further
direction from the court. The trial court ultimately interpreted the sub-
lease agreement as a sale of subleased property to Mr. Vekic for
$90,000 and consequently awarded Mr. Vekic all of the proceeds less
10% for attorney fees for past BP settlements and costs according to
the contingency fee agreement between the Popich family and their at-
torney. The trial court further ruled that any future payments from BP
belonged exclusively to Mr. Vekic without any reduction for addi-
tional attorney’s fees. The Popich family timely filed an appeal.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT
A. The Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the court focused on determining whether or not the
sublease was a sale in disguise.7 In reaching its verdict, the court
broke down its analysis into examining the intent of the parties and 
entitlement to the BP settlement proceeds. In addressing the intent
issue, the court considered Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2046 and 
20498 and concluded that the agreement between Mr. Vekic and Mr.
Popich was a sublease as evidenced by the instrument, which clearly
6. Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 483-486.
7. Id. at 487.
8. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2046, 2049 (2018).




           
         
          
         
       
            
            
          
          
          
        
      
           
      
        
         
          
      
         
     
       
        
 
          
         
          
          
         
        
         
                                                                                                         
       
    
            
         
3372019] VEKIC V. POPICH
described the intent of the lessor to lease the oyster leases to Mr.
Vekic. What was less clear was the function of the option to pur-
chase.9 Mr. Vekic argued that the format of a sublease with an option
to purchase was used because a conditional sale in which the owner
retained title until payment was made in full is prohibited in Louisi-
ana. However, the court noted that while it is true that the condi-
tional sale of a movable is prohibited, the conditional sale of an im-
movable is not. Given that the oyster leases were immovables, there
was no need to disguise a credit sale as a sublease with an option to
purchase. A credit sale can be distinguished from a lease in that the
sale contemplates ultimate ownership by the purchaser. The court
determined that this contemplation was absent given that both the
plain language of the lease and the fact that Mr. Vekic knew Mr.
Popich was “unwilling to do a credit sale” as expressed in the trans-
mittal letter conveyed to Mr. Vekic along with the other pertinent
documents prior to the lease agreement. The court was not per-
suaded by Mr. Vekic’s argument that the lease was a sale in disguise
because it lacked a stipulation that an additional consideration be
paid in order to exercise the purchase option. Though there was not
any stipulation requiring the payment of additional consideration,10 
the concept of consideration contained in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870 was eliminated as inconsistent with the Louisiana legal sys-
tem.11 
Moving on to the issue of entitlement to the BP settlement pro-
ceeds, the court noted that the sublease had a section stipulating that
in the event of damage to the lease, Mr. Vekic was entitled to receive
his actual loss.12 The sublease further defined actual loss to be the
cost of bedding oysters in the damaged area. Under the sublease, Mr.
Vekic had the right to damage proceeds in the amount sufficient to 
reimburse him for actual losses with any surplus of the reimbursed 
9. Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 488.
10. Id.
11. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2620 (2018), comment (h).
12. Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 489.




            
             
           
           
         
        
            
           
            
            
             
           
              
       
            
             
             
          
            
     
       
         
          
            
        
     
         
        
                                                                                                         
    
      
          
       
    
338 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
amount to be received by the Popich family as advance rent. However,
Mr. Vekic stated at trial13 that he had suffered no “actual loss” as de-
fined in the sublease and no evidence was admitted showing that the
oil spill damaged the oyster leases.14 The sublease provision did not
address whether Mr. Vekic would be eligible to damage proceeds be-
yond oyster bedding reimbursement. The court considered Louisiana
Civil Code article 2054, which provides that when no provision for a
particular situation is made, it must be assumed that the parties intended 
to bind themselves to the express provisions of the contract.15 The sale
of the oyster leases which occurred after the BP spill contained no ref-
erence to an assignment of rights to seek damages from BP. This was
important because the Popich family were the record owners of the
oyster leases at the time of the spill and, in order to recover from BP, it
was necessary to produce documentation evidencing record ownership 
at the time of the spill.16 Mr. Vekic could have requested that the act of
sale be modified to include an assignment of rights and he could have
exercised his option to purchase the leases prior to the spill but chose
not to. The court further noted that Mr. Vekic purchased the oyster
leases “as is” and that Louisiana courts have consistently held that a
purchaser is precluded from claiming damages to property that oc-
curred prior to the purchaser’s acquisition of the property (the subse-
quent-purchaser doctrine). The court concluded by finding that the sub-
lease with option to purchase was not a sale in disguise and that Mr.
Vekic was not entitled to the BP settlement proceeds pursuant to the
terms of the sublease with option to purchase.17 
B. The Louisiana Supreme Court Decision 
In contrast to the appellate court analysis, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court focused on determining whether the damages clause of
13. Id.
14. Id. at 490.
15. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2054 (2018).
16. Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 490.
17. Id.




          
       
      
           
      
        
          
        
         
          
     
          
           
       
         
            
      
          
         
         
             
       
         
        
         
      
        
    
        
      
                                                                                                         
            
    
      
    
      
3392019] VEKIC V. POPICH
the sublease agreement would allow Mr. Vekic to recover the BP
settlement proceeds and whether Mr. Vekic was precluded from re-
covery under the subsequent purchaser doctrine.18 Beginning with
the first issue, the court noted that section 9 of the sublease specifi-
cally stated that “[c]laims for damage to or destruction of any por-
tion of the subleased property shall be adjusted by the Lessee.” The
court determined that because the use of the word “shall,” represents
a mandatory requirement, the Popich family had expressly assigned
their right to adjust all damage claims to Mr. Vekic. Consequently,
Mrs. Harris’s act of filing a claim with the DHECC constituted a
breach of contract.19 Although the agreement did not expressly stip-
ulate that excess damages would go to Mr. Vekic, it did not allow
anyone other than Mr. Vekic to adjust claims for damages.20 It also
did not provide that the Popich family would receive anything other
than the $90,000 for “rent” and any fees or costs associated with late
payment or default. The court felt that the terms of the agreement
clearly contemplated that all claims for damages would be covered 
by its provisions and that the appellate court erred in conducting a
de novo review without giving any deference to the trial court’s de-
cision. In the court’s opinion, the agreement contained support for
an argument that it was the intent of the parties for Mr. Popich to
receive $90,000 for the oyster leases and nothing more.21 In section
10.2 of the agreement, it was stipulated that if a complete taking 
occurred, the lessor would retain the first $90,000 awarded or paid 
less the total amount of rent previously paid by the lessee with any
remaining amounts being awarded to the lessee.22 Furthermore, the
court noted that although the agreement was labeled a sublease, the
agreement provided in section 10.82 that captions and heading shall
not be considered in the construction or interpretation of the lease.
Therefore, the court determined that even though the agreement
18. Vekic v. Popich, 236 So. 3d 526, 529 (La. 2017).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 530.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 531.




        
     
          
      
         
         
         
         
         
    
           
       
            
       
         
     
         
         
       
         
       
         
         
         
            
     
     
    
             
                                                                                                         
    
      
    
      
              
  
       
340 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
was labeled a sublease, this was not significant in establishing
which party could recover damages.23 Based on these factors, the
court decided that the settlement of a claim fell within the plain
meaning of the word “adjust” and that, although the Popich family
argued that Mr. Vekic has not proved actual damages, the court’s
legal analysis did not hinge on whether Mr. Vekic’s claim against
BP was meritorious, but rather was one of contractual interpreta-
tion.24 Additionally, the court found it was not necessary to prove
actual damages in order for there to be a determination that Mr.
Vekic was entitled to damages beyond $90,000.25 
Moving on to the second issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court
found that the appellate court erroneously applied the subsequent-pur-
chaser doctrine in this case.26 In Eagle Pipe and Supply Inc. v.
Amerada Hess Corp, the court found that:
[A]n owner of property has no right or actual interest in re-
covery from a third party for damage which was inflicted on 
the property before his purchase, in the absence of an assign-
ment or subrogation of the rights belonging to the owner of
the property when the damage was inflicted.27 
In this case, however, the court contended that Eagle Pipe and 
the subsequent-purchaser doctrine did not apply because the Popich
family assigned Mr. Vekic the express right to adjust claims for
damage or destruction before the damage at issue occurred.28 The
court agreed with the court of appeals that there had been no express
assignment of rights in the act of sale. However, the court found that
no such reservation was needed because section 17 of the sublease
established that no provision of the agreement would be deemed 
waived or amended except by a written instrument unambiguously 
setting forth the matter to be waived or amended. The act of sale did
23. Id.
24. Id. at 534.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 535.
27. Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc., v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246, 256-
257 (La. 2011).
28. Vekic, 236 So. 3d at 536.




      
        
    
   
         
       
         
       
        
            
  
     
           
       
        
          
      
         
           
       
        
        
        
          
              
          
          
          
                                                                                                         
    
          
3412019] VEKIC V. POPICH
not unambiguously waive section 9 of the original sublease.29 Given 
its analysis, the court reversed the court of appeal’s decision and 
reinstated the trial court’s judgement.
IV. COMMENTARY
This commentary will first conduct a more thorough analysis of
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision that there was an assign-
ment of rights in the sublease which entitled Mr. Vekic to adjust for
and receive damage claims. Next, a synthesis approach to the appel-
late court’s and supreme court’s decisions will be considered. Fi-
nally, the principle of equity and its application to this case will be
explored.
A. Subrogation of Rights
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court appears to be correct in 
concluding that the agreement contained a subrogation of rights.
This conclusion is supported by the language in section 9 of the
agreement, which provides that claims for damage or destruction of
any portion of the subleased property shall be adjusted by the lessee.
However, section 9 of the agreement goes on to say that the lessee
shall have the right to proceeds derived from the claims which are
sufficient to reimburse the lessee for actual damages with any ex-
cesses to be paid to the lessor as advance rent. This provision sug-
gests that, though there may have been a subrogation of rights, the
subrogation was limited to claims involving actual damages. If this
is true, Mr. Vekic’s recovery would be limited and possibly precluded 
given the fact that he testified that there were no actual damages at trial.
The subrogation that occurred is conventional because it arose by 
agreement rather than by operation of law.30 Louisiana Civil Code ar-
ticle 1827 provides that a conventional subrogation is subject to the
29. Id.
30. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1829 (2018).




          
             
             
           
             
           
              
           
             
           
            
            
          
        
            
           
            
           
             
          
           
          
            
             
          
       
      
            
          
          
                                                                                                         
        
       
       
      
342 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
rules governing the assignment of rights.31 Therefore, under the Code,
the rights of Popich would be assigned to the lessee (Mr. Vekic) unless
the rights were limited by the provisions of the agreement. In this case,
the idea that the subrogation of rights was limited is not far-fetched if
one considers both the nature of an oyster lease and the intent of the
parties. Generally, the success of an oyster lease depends on the favor-
able effort of the lessee in raising oysters. As such, it makes sense that
the parties would provide for instances where damages result in a dif-
ficulty or inability to raise oysters. While it is true that these damages
can extend beyond what is physical, the parties likely did not intend to 
give this interpretation to section 9. Even though there is no specific
language saying that the subrogation of rights applies only to claims for
actual damages, there are facts that support an inference to this end. Not
only does section 9 limit the lessee’s recovery to actual damages, but
the sublease also provided that actual damages are defined as the cost
of bedding oysters in the damaged area.32 Louisiana Civil Code article
2051 says that, although a contract may be worded in general terms, it
must be interpreted to cover only those things that the parties appar-
ently intended to include. Based on this article, it is an overly broad
stretch to say that the subrogation extended to rights beyond recovery 
for actual damages. The counter to this argument would incorporate a
reference to the takings provision of the sublease. Section 10.2 of the
sublease establishes that, in the event of a complete taking, the lessor
will retain the first $90,000 with any remaining amounts to be paid to
the lessee.33 The Supreme Court determined that this provision was
proof that the agreement intended for the Popich family to recover
$90,000 and nothing more.34 However, a complete taking never oc-
curred in this case. An application of article 2051 would not support a
conclusion that this provision applies to other situations not clearly con-
templated by the parties. Generally, the finding of a complete taking 
31. Id. at art. 1827 (2018).
32. Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 489.
33. Vekic, 236 So. 3d at 531.
34. Id. at 530.




             
        
            
            
         
          
          
            
            
          
          
          
             
             
             
            
             
            
  
    
           
         
          
         
          
    
            
        
         
         
                                                                                                         
          
        
3432019] VEKIC V. POPICH
depends on whether there was a “complete loss.” As it applies to oyster
leases, a “complete loss” would involve actual damages stemming 
from the inability to raise oysters. Consequently, it might be that Mr.
Vekic can recover beyond the value of his actual damages but only in 
the event of a complete taking. This interpretation eliminates the per-
ceived conflict between the sublease provisions on taking and damages
in terms of contractual interpretation. In other words, both provisions
suggest that the parties intended these provisions to apply in the context
of actual damages rather than other kinds of damages. In light of this
consideration, the takings clause in the sublease operates as a “worst-
case scenario” with respect to recovering for actual damages.
Louisiana Civil Code article 2050 stipulates that each provision in 
a contract is to be interpreted in light of the other so that each is given 
the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.35 It is not enough
then to say that, because the agreement allows the lessee to adjust for
damages, there was a subrogation of all rights to claims for damages.
Section 9 must be read in pari materia with its entire contents and with 
the agreement as a whole to accurately establish the intent of the par-
ties.
B. A Synthesis Approach 
Assuming for the purposes of analysis that Mr. Vekic had a right
to adjust for actual damages, the question of whether this right ex-
tends to the BP settlement remains unclear. This is both because, as
noted above, Mr. Vekic admitted to the absence of actual damages
and because, in order to obtain a settlement from BP, it was stipu-
lated that documentation must be presented to show record own-
ership of the oyster leases at the time of the incident. The court
of appeals rightly noted that the oyster leases are incorporeal im-
movables and that the conditional sale of immovables is not pro-
hibited under Louisiana law.36 If the parties wanted to contract a
35. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2050 (2018).
36. Vekic, 215 So. 3d at 488.




          
           
       
           
          
       
        
            
             
        
            
            
  
         
          
         
         
          
      
        
          
        
         
         
      
        
      
      
           
           
         
                                                                                                         
      
344 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12
sale at the time of the purported lease, they could have. Neverthe-
less, the intent to this end was almost certainly lacking since Mr.
Popich included with the other original documents a transmittal
letter stating that he was “unwilling to do a credit sale.” The ap-
peals court accurately pointed out that whether or not Mr. Vekic
intended to one day obtain title from the beginning is irrelevant
because he obligated himself to the terms of the sublease which 
required him to exercise his option in order to take title of the
leases.37 As a result, even if Mr. Vekic was entitled to adjust for
claims to actual damages, this entitlement appears to be limited 
in the sense that only Mr. Popich could bring a claim for damages
against BP since he was the record owner at the time of the inci-
dent.
The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that this case involved a
matter of contractual interpretation. To the extent that it pertains
to Mr. Vekic’s recovery, this conclusion is correct. The original
sublease between Mr. Vekic and Mr. Popich provided that Mr.
Vekic could recover his actual damages. Accordingly, as a matter
of contractual interpretation, Mr. Vekic should be entitled to re-
cover. This recovery however might be contractually limited to 
the extent of his actual damages. Furthermore, based on the
guidelines set forth by BP and the facts presented, Mr. Vekic may 
be precluded from bringing the claim himself since he was not
the record owner at the time of the incident.
C. The Principle of Equity
Justice Weimer, in his partly concurring, partly dissenting opin-
ion, stated that Mr. Vekic testified to spending approximately
$250,000 on rock and oyster shells after the spill to provide cultch 
for the purpose of remediating the leases. The use of the word “re-
mediate” suggests that the leases were likely in a state of damage or
disrepair prior to the expenditure. Though Mr. Vekic testified that
37. Id. at 491.




           
           
          
         
           
        
        
 
             
         
       
        
     
          
        
          
          
           
   
      
   
         
        
      
       
    
         
      
     
                                                                                                         
         
       
              
               
      
 
3452019] VEKIC V. POPICH
there were no actual losses, it is possible that after his testimony
the oyster beds were determined to be damaged by the spill. If by
the facts and evidence presented this is deemed to be the case, Mr.
Vekic may have a contractual basis for recovering his expenditure.
What is then left to be determined is whether the result would be
different if the expenditure enhanced the condition of the leases
rather than functioning to repair an “actual loss” as defined in the
sublease.
It is clear from the language of the agreement that the parties
had not previously contemplated the windfall of the BP settlement.
According to Louisiana Civil Code article 2054, when the parties
make no provision for a particular situation it must be assumed that
they intended to bind themselves not only to the express provisions
of the contract but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage re-
gards as implied in the contract of that kind necessary for the con-
tract to achieve its purpose.38 The spirit of the agreement between
Mr. Popich and Mr. Vekic works against an argument for full re-
covery of the settlement by one of the parties as does the concept
of equity.
The settlement amount of $901,999.5039 largely exceeded the
compensation previously contemplated, equaling more than ten
times the agreed-upon price.40 As Justice Weimer aptly put it, the
parties in the original agreement intended there to be a mutual ben-
efit, with one party receiving $90,000 and the other receiving a
sublease with the possibility of obtaining title to the oyster leases.
Bringing equity into the fold and allowing Mr. Vekic to recover
the costs of remediating the leases would be consistent with
achieving the purpose of the agreement—contracting for the mu-
tual benefit of the parties.
38. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2054 (2018).
39. Vekic, 236 So. 3d at 528.
40. The $901,999.50 settlement represents part of $20.8 billion paid by BP
for its role in the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf. See Coral Davenport &
John Schwartz, BP Settlement Raised to $20.8 billion, N.Y. TIMES, https://perma
.cc/SJE7-D8GB.
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One of the requirements for recovery from BP was that an indi-
vidual must be the record owner at the time of the spill. This require-
ment leaves only Mr. Popich with the ability to file for recovery 
given that he was the record owner at the time of the spill. As a
result, any legal fees incurred during the settlement proceedings
might fall on his shoulders, which would make it unfair to deny him
reimbursement for court expenses in the event that he is awarded 
nothing. An equitable solution to the question of which party should 
be entitled to recover is that they both should. Mr. Vekic can recover
the remediation expenses even if they were not incurred as a conse-
quence of the damage inflicted by the spill. Mr. Popich, in turn, can 
receive the remainder of the settlement.
Judge Barbier, in his stated reasons for approving the original
plaintiff class settlement agreement with BP, said that oyster lease-
holders are being compensated through the Oyster Compensation 
Fund in part to pay out-of-pocket expenses for re-cultching or oth-
erwise tending to oyster lease beds.41 Mr. Vekic’s remediation 
costs are exactly the kind of damage contemplated by the spirit of
the BP’s agreement and the original sublease agreement between 
Mr. Popich and Mr. Vekic. This fact goes to an argument for eq-
uity given that Mr. Popich had sold the leases after the spill and, as
a result, no longer needed to pay for remediation expenses. The
settlement consequently represents pure profit after any court costs
for Mr. Popich because he has already received the $90,000 pro-
vided for in the sublease with option to purchase. Mr. Vekic’s de-
cision to spend $250,000 on remediating the oyster beds was likely 
based on facts establishing a need and almost certainly was not
carelessly made. While it may be important for a contractually 
based argument for recovery, it is unnecessary to establish that
damage was inflicted by the spilling of oil into the Gulf to recover
under the principle of equity. Furthermore, by the clear language of
41. Vekic, 236 So. 3d at 535.
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article 2054, equity should be considered when the parties make no
provision for a particular situation, which is the case here.
In sum, keeping an eye on the bigger picture helps make a con-
fusing situation a bit less mind-boggling. It is plausible to conclude
that neither party should be entitled to the full settlement both as a
matter of contractual interpretation and according to the principle
of equity, which aims at avoiding unjust enrichment. The doctrine
of enrichment without cause, enshrined in article 2298, is not irrel-
evant but need not be relied upon given the existence of a valid ju-
ridical act to which the litigants were parties. Louisiana Civil Code
article 2054 establishes that when the parties make no provision for
a particular situation it must be assumed that they intended to bind 
themselves not only to the express provisions of the contract but
also to whatever the law, equity, or usage regards as implied in the
contract of that kind necessary for the contract to achieve its pur-
pose. Balancing the concepts of contractual interpretation and eq-
uity embraces article 2054 and the spirit of article 2298 by recon-
ciling what appears at first glance to be conflicting legal principles
and bringing to light a solution that is appropriate for the circum-
stances. Equity may echo the fable by Jean de La Fontaine, but
in Vekic v. Popich there is more than just one oyster to be shared
among the litigants.
